Device, system and methods using angle of arrival measurements for ADS-B authentication and navigation
10365374 ยท 2019-07-30
Assignee
Inventors
Cpc classification
G01S5/08
PHYSICS
G01S3/46
PHYSICS
G01S5/0072
PHYSICS
International classification
G01S19/21
PHYSICS
G01S5/00
PHYSICS
G01S3/46
PHYSICS
Abstract
The present disclosure is directed to a receiver for Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) verification of a target aircraft including a first input for receiving flight tracking information from a target aircraft that indicates positional information of the target aircraft. The receiver further includes a second input for receiving positional and heading information indicating the location and orientation of a multi-element array antenna configured to be attached to the receiver, and a processing module that generates a measured bearing derived from angle of arrival data, and an expected bearing of the target aircraft derived from the indicated positional information of the target aircraft and the positional and heading information defining the receiver location and orientation. A comparator compares the expected bearing to the measured bearing and verifies the ADS-B flight tracking information of the target aircraft and outputs an indication of authenticity based on the verification.
Claims
1. A method of measuring an Angle of Arrival (AOA), comprising: cycling a commutating solid state switch between each antenna element of a multi-element array antenna based on a synchronization signal that determines a speed at which the commutating solid state switch switches between each antenna element; receiving at least one signal at the multi-element array antenna so that a time multiplexed RF signal is received at an output of the commutating solid state switch; converting the time multiplexed RF signal at an analog-to-digital (A/D) converter based on the synchronization signal into a plurality of antenna element specific digital samples for each discrete signal, wherein the synchronization signal controls sampling times of the A/D converter; de-multiplexing the plurality of antenna element specific digital samples into discrete digital data streams for each antenna element of the multi-element array antenna; and determining a measured AOA of the at least one signal based on measuring a relative phase of a carrier signal identified in each discrete digital data stream of the respective antenna elements of the commutating multi-element array antenna.
2. The method according to claim 1, where the signal comprises an ADS-B signal including indicated positional data from a target transmitter.
3. The method according to claim 2, further comprising: decoding the indicated positional data from the target transmitter from one discrete digital data stream for a single antenna element of the multi-element array antenna via an ADS-B signal demodulation process; determining an expected AOA of the target transmitter derived from the decoded indicated positional data from the target transmitter, and positional information defining a location of the receiver system and heading information defining an orientation of an antenna subsystem of the receiver system; comparing the expected AOA to the measured AOA to verify the indicated positional data from the target transmitter in the received ADS-B signal; and providing an indication of authenticity based on verifying the indicated positional data from the target transmitter.
4. The method according to claim 1, wherein the at least one signal comprises a plurality of signals from at least two emitters of signals of opportunity.
5. The method according to claim 4, further comprising: retrieving an identity for each respective emitter from a database; determining a location for each emitter based on the identity for each respective emitter from the database; determining AOAs for each signal from the respective emitters based on measuring the relative phase of the carrier signal identified in each discrete digital data stream of the respective antenna elements of the commutating multi-element array antenna; and computing an independent position fix of the antenna subsystem of the receiver system based on the AOAs locations and each respective emitter location.
6. The method of claim 1, further comprising: generating a measured bearing of a target aircraft derived from the measured AOA; generating an expected bearing of the target aircraft derived from an indicated positional information of the target aircraft determined from received ADS-B information; and comparing the expected bearing to the measured bearing to verify the ADS-B information.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the A/D converter is a single shared A/D converter.
8. A system, comprising: a multi-element array antenna; a commutating solid state switch configured to cycle between each antenna element of the multi-element array antenna based on a synchronization signal, the synchronization signal determining a speed at which the commutating solid state switch switches between each antenna element, wherein the multi-element array is configured to receive at least one signal so that a time multiplexed RF signal is received at an output of the commutating solid state switch; an A/D converter configured to convert the time multiplexed RF signal based on the synchronization signal into a plurality of antenna element specific digital samples for each discrete signal, wherein the synchronization signal controls sampling times of the A/D converter; and a signal processing apparatus configured to: de-multiplex the plurality of antenna element specific digital samples into discrete digital data streams for each antenna element of the multi-element array antenna, and determine a measured AOA of the at least one signal based on measuring a relative phase of a carrier signal identified in each discrete digital data stream of the respective antenna elements of the commutating multi-element array antenna.
9. The system of claim 8, where the signal comprises an ADS-B signal including indicated positional data from a target transmitter.
10. The system of claim 9, wherein the signal processing apparatus is configured to: decode the indicated positional data from the target transmitter from one discrete digital data stream for a single antenna element of the multi-element array antenna via an ADS-B signal demodulation process; determine an expected AOA of the target transmitter derived from the decoded indicated positional data from the target transmitter, and positional information defining a location of the receiver system and heading information defining an orientation of an antenna subsystem of the receiver system; compare the expected AOA to the measured AOA to verify the indicated positional data from the target transmitter in the received ADS-B signal; and provide an indication of authenticity based on verifying the indicated positional data from the target transmitter.
11. The system of claim 8, wherein the at least one signal comprises a plurality of signals from at least two emitters of signals of opportunity.
12. The system of claim 11, wherein the signal processing apparatus is configured to: retrieve an identity for each respective emitter from a database; determine a location for each emitter based on the identity for each respective emitter from the database; determine AOAs for each signal from the respective emitters based on measuring the relative phase of the carrier signal identified in each discrete digital data stream of the respective antenna elements of the commutating multi-element array antenna; and compute an independent position fix of the antenna subsystem of the receiver system based on the AOAs locations and each respective emitter location.
13. The system of claim 8, wherein the signal processing apparatus is configured to: generate a measured bearing of a target aircraft derived from the measured AOA; generate an expected bearing of the target aircraft derived from an indicated positional information of the target aircraft determined from received ADS-B information; and compare the expected bearing to the measured bearing to verify the ADS-B information.
14. A receiver unit, comprising: an A/D converter configured to: receive a time multiplexed RF signal from an output of a commutating solid state switch, wherein the commutating solid state switch is configured to cycle between each antenna element of a multi-element array antenna based on a synchronization signal that determines a speed at which the commutating solid state switch switches between each antenna element, and convert the time multiplexed RF signal based on the synchronization signal into a plurality of antenna element specific digital samples for each discrete signal, wherein the synchronization signal controls sampling times of the A/D converter; and a signal processing apparatus configured to: de-multiplex the plurality of antenna element specific digital samples into discrete digital data streams for each antenna element of the multi-element array antenna, and determine a measured AOA of the at least one signal based on measuring a relative phase of a carrier signal identified in each discrete digital data stream of the respective antenna elements of the commutating multi-element array antenna.
15. The receiver unit of claim 14, where the signal comprises an ADS-B signal including indicated positional data from a target transmitter.
16. The receiver unit of claim 15, wherein the signal processing apparatus is configured to: decode the indicated positional data from the target transmitter from one discrete digital data stream for a single antenna element of the multi-element array antenna via an ADS-B signal demodulation process; determine an expected AOA of the target transmitter derived from the decoded indicated positional data from the target transmitter, and positional information defining a location of the receiver system and heading information defining an orientation of an antenna subsystem of the receiver system; compare the expected AOA to the measured AOA to verify the indicated positional data from the target transmitter in the received ADS-B signal; and provide an indication of authenticity based on verifying the indicated positional data from the target transmitter.
17. The receiver unit of claim 14, wherein the at least one signal comprises a plurality of signals from at least two emitters of signals of opportunity.
18. The receiver unit of claim 17, wherein the signal processing apparatus is configured to: retrieve an identity for each respective emitter from a database; determine a location for each emitter based on the identity for each respective emitter from the database; determine AOAs for each signal from the respective emitters based on measuring the relative phase of the carrier signal identified in each discrete digital data stream of the respective antenna elements of the commutating multi-element array antenna; and compute an independent position fix of the antenna subsystem of the receiver system based on the AOAs locations and each respective emitter location.
19. The receiver unit of claim 14, wherein the signal processing apparatus is configured to: generate a measured bearing of a target aircraft derived from the measured AOA; generate an expected bearing of the target aircraft derived from an indicated positional information of the target aircraft determined from received ADS-B information; and compare the expected bearing to the measured bearing to verify the ADS-B information.
Description
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
(1) The embodiments presented herein will become more fully understood from the detailed description and the accompanying drawings, wherein:
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
(10) The following detailed description is directed to a time multiplexed antenna array used in conjunction with a software based receiver to enable Angle of Arrival (AOA) measurements of signals of opportunity in the 960-1215 MHz band. Use of these AOA measurements allows for both the authentication of ADS-B transmissions from other aircraft to detect spoofing of ADS-B signals, and allows for independent navigation using received signals-of-opportunity from a variety of systems already operating in the 960-1215 MHz band to provide an alternative to satellite navigation.
(11) The device and method embodiments presented herein address two issues with ADS-B, the first being that currently ADS-B broadcasts have no built in security or authentication capability. This leaves the system vulnerable to spoofing attacks where a bad actor can broadcast false airplane position reports that may cause false alerts in airborne or ground systems. Ground based systems may include some additional sensing capability, (e.g., radar or multi-lateration), to address this type of attack. However, such systems are expensive to implement and maintain. Also, no similar airborne alternative exists. The embodiments presented herein provide a means of authenticating an ADS-B signal being broadcast from a transmitter with the correct relative bearing to the position included in the position report.
(12) The second problem is that air traffic management systems are becoming increasing dependent on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) or Satellite Navigation (SatNav) technologies like Global Positioning Systems (GPS). However, these technologies may be jammed with RF interference and can possibly be spoofed to give erroneous results. The embodiments presented herein enable a completely independent navigation capability using existing signals of opportunity broadcast in the 960-1215 MHz band. An airborne receiver using this technique can determine the relative bearing to a variety of ground based transmitters including Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) stations, ADS-B rebroadcast stations, secondary surveillance radar, Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) ground stations, ADS-B re-broadcast stations, etc. By combing several bearing measurements with information about the known locations of the transmitters (carried in an on-board database) the user's position can be determined. Such angle measurements may also be combined with GNSS measurements, inertial measurements or other navigation measurements in a suitably designed Kalman filter or other type of estimation algorithm in order to enhance fault detection and mitigation capabilities. In this way, spoofing of GNSS can be detected and the potential impact of undetected spoofing attacks limited.
(13)
(14) The commutating solid state switch device 112 and LNA 114 are powered via a voltage that comes to the antenna array assembly 100 on a center conductor 116 of a single coaxial cable 118 that connects the receiver 120 to the antenna array assembly 100. A timing signal 119, (illustrated by the dashed line passing through the single coaxial cable 118), produced by a sampling clock 151 may also be fed to the antenna via the coaxial cable 116 from the receiver subsystem 120 to the antenna array assembly 100. The timing signal 119 determines the speed at which the commutating switch array switches through each of the antenna elements 102. The timing signal 119 is also provided to the A/D converter 124 to control the sampling times of the converter. The antenna elements 102 and other antenna array assembly elements may be designed to operate on signals in the 960 to 1215 MHz band. However, the RF multiplexing system described here could be generally applied to any frequency band with appropriate design of antenna elements. The result of the antenna array assembly 100 configuration is that RF signals from each of the antenna elements 104-110 are multiplexed onto a single coaxial cable 118 and transmitted (after appropriate amplification as necessary) to the receiver subsystem 120. The switching of the antenna elements 102 is done at a very high rate, (e.g., 10-100 MHz), but at a rate below the Nyquist frequency of the lowest frequency of interest divided by the number of elements, (here four, 104-110), in the array. The embodiments described herein incorporate a system that uses time multiplexing of RF onto the single coaxial cable 118 that enable much simpler installation, i.e., a single coaxial cable between the receiver and antenna array assembly, whereas the current Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) uses four antenna elements using four separate co-axial cables to each independent element in the antenna array.
(15) The receiver system 10 takes the time-multiplexed RF signals from the antenna array assembly 100 and down converts the signals at a down converter 122 to an intermediate frequency. This intermediate signal is then applied to an A/D converter 124 which samples the signal at well above twice the Nyquist frequency of the intermediate signal. Alternatively, if a high enough sampling rate is used, the multiplexed RF signal could be sampled directly without need for down-conversion at the down converter 122. Either way, the principle of operation as described below remains the same. The sampling rate and antenna element switching rate are arranged so that at least one sample of the RF is obtained within the time period that an antenna element (104-110) is attached. After A/D conversion 124, the digital signals are passed to a signal processing apparatus 130 that may process the digital signals in a software and/or hardware domain. The sampled RF signals are then de-multiplexed at a digital de-multiplexer 132 into separate data streams for each of the antenna elements 104-110.
(16) One of the data streams 133 containing a signal of interest from at least one antenna element (104-110) is used at a demodulating and message decoding unit 134 to demodulate the signal of interest to determine position information from a broadcast ADS-B signal. This data-stream 133 is hereafter referred to as the primary sampled signal. The airborne receiver unit 10 receives the own-ship GPS position from an on-board GPS receiver 140 and with the two positions, computes at a vector computing unit 138 a vector between the own-ship position and position indicated in the received ADS-B signal. The airborne receiver 10 also receives the airplane pitch, roll and heading information from the on-board Inertial Reference Unit (IRU) system 144 and translates at a vector translation unit 142 the vector from an earth reference frame to an airplane reference frame. Thereafter, an expected AOA signal e is computed at a computed AOA unit 146 from the received ADS-B position.
(17) Therefore, the orientation of the antenna array assembly 100 is directly responsible for determining the location and orientation of the platform that carries the airborne receiver unit 10. The receiver unit 120 may have any orientation inside the vehicle; however, the orientation in space of the antenna array assembly 100 must be known to compute the expected AOA of the target aircraft broadcasting the respective ADS-B signal.
(18) The sampled copies of the primary signal 133 from the other antenna elements are processed in parallel with the expected AOA signal calculation and are used to measure at an AOA measuring unit 136 a relative angle of arrival (AOA) of the signal of interest. The primary signal 133 can be used to detect the existence of a pulsed signal, such as an ADS-B report or Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) reply pulses. Then, when a period of signal presence is verified, the relative phase of the carrier between each of the sampled antenna element signals is measured using a phase comparator realized in a digital signal processing algorithm. The phase of each signal can be determined using a Costas loop and a digital reference oscillator, or by many other well know means. The exact frequency for the digital reference oscillator can be determined by Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) block processing of the sampled signal. The measured AOA signal m can then be determined from the relative phase of the signal on each antenna element and based on knowledge of the geometry of the antenna elements. The geometry of the antenna elements may be designed in order to better facilitate the AOA measurements. Having both the measured AOA and the expected AOA, these values are compared in an AOA comparing unit 148 to output a target validity indication 150 regarding the validity of the target ADS-B positional information.
(19) Therefore, the AOA may be determined for any signal that has a relatively stable carrier frequency. In one embodiment presented herein, the AOA measurements may be made for two different purposes: 1) to provide confirmation of the source of an ADS-B report as shown in
(20)
(21) The receiver 10 simultaneously processes the ADS-B signal received from the aircraft 250 and determines a measured AOA bearing m from the relative phase of the signal on each antenna element as described above. Any difference between expected AOA bearing e and the measured AOA bearing m to the airplane 250 becomes a detection statistic that can be used in a hypothesis test. The hypothesis is that the ADS-B report actually comes from the location (here target aircraft 250) reported in the ADS-B message. Any difference between the expected AOA bearing e and the measured AOA bearing m is compared to a threshold that is derived based on the accuracy of the AOA measurements such that an acceptable probability of a false detection is achieved. In
(22)
(23) The receiver 10 simultaneously processes the ADS-B signal received from the transmitter 350 and determines a measured AOA signal m from the relative phase of the signal on each antenna element as described above. In the scenario of
(24) The second application using the measured AOA values includes an alternative position determination system, as illustrated in
(25) 1Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) reply pulses. These are pulse pairs broadcast by a DME ground station in reply to interrogations by airborne users. The reply pulses may be intended for the airplane that the AOA navigation system resides on, or they may be intended as replies to interrogations from other airplanes. Only the AOA information is used and the timing associated with DME ranging is ignored. DME reply pulses are also generated by a ground station without any associated interrogation pulses in order to keep the duty cycle of the transmitter in an acceptable range.
(26) 21090 MHz ADS-B Re-broadcast messages, which are ADS-B reports broadcast from the ground telling of airplane positions for airplanes using non-1090 MHz ADS-B.
(27) 31030 MHz Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) interrogations from SSR radars at known locations.
(28) 4Future L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) communications transmissions. A proposal exists for a new communication system called LDACS which is intended to exist in the 960-1215 MHz band. It is further proposed that LDACS may provide a range determination function which could easily be accommodated in the envisioned receiver system as well. In addition to the LDACS ranging, this AOA measurement could be applied for further authentication and/or fault detection and mitigation.
(29) 5Future DME band based pseudolite signals. One of the proposals for a future non-GNSS position determination signal is to implement a new ground based ranging source in the DME band. The AOA measurement signals could take advantage of those signals as well should they ever exist.
(30) 6Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) ground station transmissions. One of the standards for ADS-B used in the United States includes ground based transmissions at 978 MHz. The UAT technology allows additional information to be uplinked to aircraft from ground stations through FIS-B (Flight Information SystemBroadcast). This information includes weather and Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) information.
(31)
(32)
(33) The embodiments described herein are different than other proposed Alternate Position and Navigation and Timing (APNT) systems in that the do not provide precise time transfer to the airborne receiver, but they also do not require precise time synchronization of ground based or airborne assets to operate. The embodiments described herein can produce a position estimate based on bearing measurements only and without range measurements. The embodiments described herein do not require any new ground-based infrastructure, but only airborne equipment. The embodiments described herein may also be used in ground based receivers to provide position determination capability. The embodiments described herein allow for simpler, cheaper ground systems that can provide independent positioning capability.
(34) The embodiments described herein address the above solutions in a relatively simple easy to install receiver package, and solves the lack of ADS-B authentication problem for which there is no other adequate solution proposed for airborne equipment. By combing several bearing measurements with information about the known locations of the transmitters, (carried in an on-board database), the user's position can be determined. Such angle measurements may be combined with GNSS measurements, inertial measurements or other navigation measurements in a suitably designed Kalman filter or other type of estimation algorithm in order to enhance fault detection and mitigation capabilities. In this way, spoofing of GNSS can be detected and the potential impact of undetected spoofing attacks limited.
(35)
(36) The receiver at 510 may make a determination regarding what type of functional application it assumes to further process the received signals. Since different types of signals are transmitted on different frequencies, the receiver 10 knows the type of signal it processes when it tunes to that particular frequency. Furthermore, the receiver exploits knowledge about the general signal structure when measuring the phase to determine the measured AOA as described above. When the receiver assumes the function of providing ADS-B authentication 512, the ADS-B signal received at the receiver is further processed with antenna array position and orientation information to verify the authenticity of that position information as compared to a measured AOA calculation performed above.
(37) When the receiver assumes the function of providing navigation and position determination at 510 of
(38)
(39) The above implementation may use the known location of ground-based AOA receivers 810-830 and their respective measured bearings .sub.1-.sub.3 to airborne targets (e.g., target aircraft 802), to independently determine the target's location. The measured results are compared to the position reported by the target via the ADS-B signal information. Any difference in the measured verses the reported position is applied as test statistic in the classical hypothesis test to detect spoofing of the airborne target. The location of spoofer can thereby be determined without cooperation of the spoofer, and the location of all ADS-B traffic can be independently determined yielding a AOA surveillance backup capability when GPS information is denied or unavailable. The subject matter described above is provided by way of illustration only and should not be construed as limiting. Various modifications and changes may be made to the subject matter described herein without following the example embodiments and applications illustrated and described, and without departing from the true spirit and scope of the present disclosure, which is set forth in the following claims.